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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE,
dba B & B PLAZA, INC.,

:
:

Civi1 No. 860402

PIaint i ffs/Appel1 ants,:
vs.

:

LEGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC. ,

:
:

Defendant/Respondent. :
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED QN APPEAL
Whether

the

Trial

Court's decision dismissing Plaintiffs1

Complaint on the basis that the

cause of

action was

beyond the

applicable statute of limitations was in error.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In

this

proceeding,

Plaintiffs sought damages against the

Defendant for the improper manufacture, production

and supply of

concrete used in the design and construction of storage units.
The action was brought within the statutory time pursuant to
78-12-25.5 Utah Cod e Annotated,
Motion to

Dismiss, based

(1953).

The Defendant

filed a

upon the statute of limitations period

contained in 70(a)-2-725, Utah Code Annotated, on the

basis that

this was a sale of goods.
Following

a

Court, on June 16,

hearing
1986,

and

submission

dismissed
1

of

Plaintiffs1

Memorandums, the
Complaint with

prejud ice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs

request

that this

Court

the Trial Court and allow the matter

to

reverse the decision of
proceed

to

trial on the

me r i t s.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In

1978,

the

Plaintiffs,

business known as the B &
State

of

caused

to be constructed,

the

Utah.

purpose

As

of

other recreational
Lake area.
Motion

B Plaza

part

renting

as

individuals,

in Garden

a

City, Rich County,

of their anticipated business, they

concrete and

metal

storage

units for

individual units for storing boats and

items for

people who

(See Record, Memorandum

were visiting

in Opposition

the Bear

to Defendant's

to Dismiss)

The Plaintiffs desired to have concrete
for

initiated

the

base

contacted

the

Defendant

that

of

said

storage

Defendant.
it could

units

Plaintiffs
provide the

footings and floors

and
were

for

this purpose,

advised

concrete and pour

by

the

the same

for Plaintiffs 1 purposes.
The Plaintiffs had no specific knowledge
concrete required,

but

Defendant manufactured
poured

the

as to

the type of

left that decision to the Defendant.
the concrete, supplied

concrete.

it to the

The construction was completed

The

site and
in early

1979.
Shortly after said construction,
concrete began

to crack

the

Spring

of

1979, the

and show other signs of damage, so that
2

eventually the storage units
not close

properly.

became unusable.

to

having

their

property

to rent

suffer

because of the alleged improper concrete.
of Billie

doors would

The walls and foundation separated and the

Plaintiffs lost money from the inability
addition

The

J. Cottle

said units, in

damage

and waste,

(See Record, Affidavit

and Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss)
The Plaintiffs filed their
recovery,

pursuant

which provides

a

to

action in

November of

1985 for

Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated,

seven

(7)

year

statute

of

limitations for

actions alleging defective design.
In May of 1986, without any discovery having been taken, but
simply

after

Defendant

the

moved

filing
for

Plaintiffs' action

the

Summary

was

Section 70(a)-2-725,

of

really

Complaint

Judgment
a

sale

on
of

Answer,

the
goods,

basis

the
that

pursuant to

Utah Code Annotated, (1953), which required

that an action be brought for breach of
(4) years.

and

such a

sale within four

Plaintiffs' action was brought some six and one-half

(6 1/2) years after the completion of construction and therefore,
the Defendant's argued was beyond the statute of limitations.
The Court received
hearing arguments

Memoranda

on June

from

the

parties

and after

2, 1986, determined that the four (4)

year statute of limitations was applicable and dismissed the case
on June 16, 1986.

This appeal was taken from that decision.
SUvMARY OF THE ARGUvENT

The Trial

Court erred in applying the four (4) year statute
3

of

limitations,

rather

limitations and

than

the

seven

(7)

year

statute of

the case should be remanded for trial based upon

the seven (7) year statute of limitations period,
ARGUMENT

This case poses a question which

has not

been specifically

addressed by this Court before.
Because this
only pleadings
Memorandums

matter was

before

and

this

denied by
Court

Affidavits.

are

the merits.

Complaint, Answer,

evidentiary hearing was

This Court is forced therefore, based upon

those meager facts, to
periods of

the

No other discovery, Depositions,

Interrogatories, etc., were taken and no
held on

a Motion to Dismiss the

consider

limitation to

the

applicability

this situation

of

two (2)

and determine which is

the proper statutory period in order to resolve this appeal.
There is no question that this case is a case of both of the
sale of

goods and

of defective construction.

in the business of manufacturing concrete.
business purposes,

desired to

storage units.

furtherance of

In

The Defendant was

The

Plaintiffs, for

utilize the concrete to construct
that purpose

they contracted

with the Defendant for the purchase of concrete.
That the

type of

mix, number of bags, the water to be used

and those types of decisions which may be different, depending on
the particular use of the concrete were left to the Defendant.
In this

case, the

Plaintiffs1 purchased

the concrete from

the Defendant and therefore, it was, as Defendant alleged, a sale
of goods

and could be viewed as falling within the four (4) year
4

period pursuant
case where

to Section 70(a)-2-725.

Plaintiffs

However,

just simply purchased

it

and utilized

it in

poured the

concrete,

it

the concrete,
of their units.

by the Defendant.

The Defendant

provided the forms, it formed the floor

and walls of the storage
construction.

over

the construction

This work was also accomplished

units

and

in

Therefore, the Defendant

fact,

handled

the

completion of construction, Plaintiffs

the construction was defective.

pursuant

to

Section 78-12-25.5,

year statute of

construction was
was filed

on

referred
was not

allege

actionable

for a seven

the Spring

of 1979.

of 1985, clearly beyond

the

period,

but

(7)

show that
This action

the four

(4) year

within

the seven (7) year

The

Defendant's Motion

period.
is

four

very
(4)

apparently

simple.
year

statute

accepted

that

to the seven (7) year period,
instituted until

concrete and
clearly

which provides

completed by

then

Christofferson

clearly

to Dismiss

limitation

The case

is

the Motion

in November
of

This

time of

statute of limitation

focused

the

limitations.

The facts at the

statute

its product

(or

structure.

Following
that

all the

not only manufactured

designed) the product, but also constructed, with
ut1imate

is not a

the concrete, picked

it up and then, themselves, exercised control
poured

this

delivery of

found, that the

seven

(7)

the same
governing
5

of limitation.
argument,

indicating

years after
to the
theory

but

also

that the action
the sale

site.
or

Judge

of the

Ke therefore,

gravamen

of this

lawsuit was a sale of goods, rather than a construction or design
defect.
In addressing
applicable

time

first

from what

period should

action

be made.

the calculation

of the

It is apparent

that

four (4) year period for the sale of goods runs from the
the actual

sale.

in fact

the seven

it was

not) it

of Hooper
745 (Utah
alleged

date of

The Judge seemed to be saying however, that if
(7) year period was applicable,

(which he found

would run also from the sale and delivery of the

goods, since this was
This

the

in fact, a sale of goods

situation.

is contrary to this Court's previous ruling
Water

Improvement

1982) in which
because

of

in the case

District v. John O. Reeve, 642 P.2d

the Court,

construction

in a case
and

wherein damage was

improvements

the seven (7) year period,

to property

which did

fall within

that

the period

ran from

the comp let ion of construction, not at the inception of

construction or from the delivery of various construction
In this case, Plaintiffs
in the
seven

Spring of 1979 and
(7) year period

Plaintiffs
discussed
was four
that

this

from that

concede

Courts

that

period.

Plaintiffs

jurisdiction,

the Tenth Circuit, have consistently

two conflicting periods of

limitation
6

the

Court
this

submit

this jurisdiction has not made a

specific ruling, that the Courts of other
States within

although

focus was on whether or not

(7) year
of

the

time.

however,

matter, the real

the

of construction

in fact, the suit was filed within

(4) year or seven

although

allege completion

items.

apply

to

including

ruled that if

the

same facts

situation,

that

the

longer

statute

should

be the applicable

statute.
In Shew v. Coombay Loafers, 455 P.2d
a Washington Supreme Court case the Court

359

(Washington

1969),

specifically held that,

11

If it
is questionable which of two statute
of limitations apply, the
rule
is that the
statute
applying
the
longest
period
is
generally used."
This same logic was reiterated
Au v.

Au, 626

following

P.2d

language

173

(Hawaii

in a Hawaii

1981),

decision,

where the

Court

in the

indicates

"However, where
two or more causes of action
arise from a single
transaction, different
statute of limitations are applicable to each
of the separate claims.
In addition, Courts
will apply the longer limitations period when
there
is doubt
as
to which
statute it
applies."
(Id at 182)
Finally, the Courts attention

is directed

Thiel v. Taurus Dri11ing, 710 P.2d,
the Court

to a Montana case,

33 (Montana

again cites the general proposition

1985),

in which

that

"Where there
is a substantial question as to
which of two or more statutes
of limitations
should apply,
the general rule is that doubt
should be resolved in
favor
of
the statute
containing the longest limitation."
There is

no question

gives rise to two
warranty or

in this

(2) separate

implied

fitness

case that

claims:

for purpose

the fact

A claim

situation

for breach of

from the sale of goods

and also for design and construction defects.
There is also no
apply.

question that

That being four

Finally, there

two (2)

limitation

periods

(4) years and seven (7) years.

is no

question
7

that the

action was filed

within the seven (7) year period.
record at
have

the time

applied

the

of the

Based

Motion to

longer

upon the

status of the

Dismiss, the Court should

statutory

period

and

allowed

the

Plaintiffs to continue with their litigation.
The

failure

to

do

so

v/as

error on the Court's part and

should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
It is well settled that where there are
periods of

limitation, the

two (2) conflicting

longer period should be applied.

this case, Plaintiffs 1 claim

was filed

within a

In

seven (7) year

per iod.
That

both

applicable

and

periods

under

therefore,

the

the

facts

District

of the case could be
Court

erred

in

not

applying the longer period.
It

is

decision of

respectfully
the lower

requested

Court and

that this Court reverse the

remand the

case for continued

proceedings consistent with allowing the litigation to proceed to
a trial on the merits.

.
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8
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ADDENDUM

78-12-25.5

JUDICIAL CODE

back overcharge for public u t i l i t y service,
108 A. L. R. 751.
When s t a t u t e begins to run against action to iccovor upon c o n t r a c t paynblo in
iiiHlulJmonlH, 8:3 A. L. It. 310.
When s t a t u t e commences to run against
action for breach of w a r r a n t y on sale of
chattels, 75 A. L. R. 1086.
When s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s begins to
run against action for loss of service or
consortium, 173 A. L. It. 750.
When s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s begins to
run against action on a c o n t r a c t which
contemplates an a c t u a l demand, 159 A. L.
R. 1021.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

When s t a t u t e of limitations commences
to run against action by a t t o r n e y employed on contingent foe who was disolmrgod or willidi ow bof'oio doloi niimition
of litigation or oilier event on which his
compensation was contingent, 118 A. L. It.
1281.
When s t a t u t e of limitations commences
1o run against nn action based on breach
of duty by recording officer, 110 A. L. R.
1067.
When s t a t u t e of limitations commences
to run against claim for contribution or
indemnity based on tort, 57 A. L. It. 3d
867.

78-12-25.5. I n j u r y due to defective design or construction of improvement to real property—Within seven years.—No action to recover damages
for any injury to property, real or personal, or for any injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought against any
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to real property more than
seven years after the completion of construction.
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, or
any other legal entity.
(2) Completion of construction for the purposes of this act shall
mean the date of issuance of a certificate of substantial completion by the
owner, architect, engineer or other agents, or the date of the owner's use
or possession of the improvement on real property.
The limitation imposed by this provision shall not apply to any person
in actual possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed
to bring an action.
This provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any
action.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, e n a c t e d b y
L. 1967, ch. 218, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act enacting a new section 78-12-25.5
Utah Code A n n o t a t e d 1953, r e l a t i n g to t h e
limitations of actions b y p r o v i d i n g a time
limit within which actions for i n j u r y to
p r o p e r t y or death must be b r o u g h t a g a i n s t
persons who performed or furnished t h e

Constitutionality.
Seven-year limitation is applicable to
t h e owner or t e n a n t in possession a t time
of construction, or to their successors;
those in possession and control of realty
have a continuing duly to m a k e repairs,
and should discover any f a u l t in construction within seven y e a r s ; claim t h a t t h e
s t a t u t e is unconstitutional is w i t h o u t merit.
Good v

nh-ri*4-~

<--

W h a t s t a t u t e of limitations governs action b y contractoo for defective or im-

78-

proper performance of work b y I
building contractor, 1 A. L. R. 3d 9J

78-12-26. Within three years.—Within three years :
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real prop
provided, that when waste or trespass is committed by means of u
ground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action shall n<
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved p a r t y o
facts constituting such waste or trespass.
(2) An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal prop
including actions for specific recovery thereof; provided, t h a t in all <
where the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually includ*
the term "livestock," having upon it at the time of its loss a reco
mark or brand, if such animal had strayed or was stolen from the
owner without his fault, the cause shall not be deemed to have ace
until the owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would p
reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession thereof by the defenc
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; but
cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued l
the discovery by the aggrieved p a r t y of the facts constituting the fi
or mistake.
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, o
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except w
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of
state.
H i s t o r y : L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; O. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-26.
Compiler's Notes.
This section, w i t h t h e exception of subd.
(4) which h a s been added, is identical
to former section 104-2-24 (Code 1943)
which was repealed b y L a w s 1951, ch.
58, § 3.
Subdivision (4) of t h i s section is identical in substance to former section 104-224.10 (Code 1943) which w a s repealed by
L a w s 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Cross-References.
" A c t i o n " includes special proceeding,
78-12-46.
# #
P r o d u c t L i a b i l i t y Act, s t a t u t e of limitations, 78-15-3.
, v , ,, a
,. , ,
Subdivision (1)—held inappHcable.
Action against railroad for damages
to

Dlaintiff'*

T>mrK>r+v K^r -Io~ ~*

—.„-.:--

providing t h a t p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y shall
be damaged for public use without
pensation, a n d action to recover
damages was not governed b y predec<
to this section b u t b y limitation on a d
for relief not otherwise provided
W e b b e r v. S a l t L a k e City, 40 U. 221,
P . 503, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115.
Subdivision (1) of t h i s section did
govern action by landowner for com
sation for t a k i n g his l a n d w i t h o u t
consent and without condemnation
ceedings b y railroad company. S a l t I
I n v . Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.
u . 203, 148 P . 439, affd. 246 U. S. 446
L. E d . 823, 38 S. Ct. 348, applying for
statute.
Action for damages to plaintiff's li
duo to coment, dust and smoko oma
ing from defendant's cement plant,
not barred w h e r e brought ten years a
p l a n t ' s commencement of oDeratinrr if

w - i - - .

(b)

(c)

VJLViU

v/VJ.TJLJ.TJLJLJAVV-'A.n.JLI

SALES

\J\JXJS2J

property or an insurable interest in the goods; and if the goods
have been destroyed or converted a right of action is also in the
p a r t y who either bore the risk of loss under the contract for sale
or has since the injury assumed that risk as against the other;
if at the time of the injury the party plaintiff did not bear the risk
of loss as against the other p a r t y to the contract for sale and there
is no arrangement between them for disposition of the recovery,
his suit or settlement is, subject to his own interest, as a fiduciary
for the other p a r t y to the contract;
either party may with the consent of the other sue for the benefit
of whom it may concern.

History:

L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-722.

CoUateral References.
Sales<§=>224, 232.
77 C.J.S. Sales § 285.

70A-2-723. Proof of market price—Time and place.—(1) If an action
ised on anticipatory repudiation comes to trial before the time for per>rmance with respect to some or all of the goods, any damages based on
arket price (section 70A-2-708 or section 70A-2-713) shall be determined
wording to the price of such goods prevailing at the time when the ag*ieved party learned of the repudiation.
(2) If evidence of a price prevailing at the times or places described
this chapter is not readily available the price prevailing within any reanable time before or after the time described or at any other place which
commercial judgment or under usage of trade would serve as a reasonae substitute for the one described may be used, making any proper allowlce for the cost of transporting the goods to or from such other place.
(3) Evidence of a relevant price prevailing at a time or place other
an the one described in this chapter offered by one party is not admissible
lless and until he has given the other party such notice as the court finds
fficient to prevent unfair surprise.
History:

L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-723.

Collateral References.
Sales<&=>384(2), 418(2).
78 C.J.S. Sales §§ 484, 546.

70A-2-724. Admissibility of market quotations.—"Whenever the prevailg price or value of any goods regularly bought and sold in any established
mmodity market is in issue, reports in official publications or trade jourIs or in newspapers or periodicals of general circulation published as the
ports of such market shall be admissible in evidence. The circumstances
the preparation of such a report may be shown to affect its weight but
it its admissibility.
Elistory:

L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-724.

Collateral References.
Evidence<§=>361.
32 C.J.S. Evidence § 724.

may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may nc
extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of th
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warrant
occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty ei
plicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of th
breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrue
when the breach is or should have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsectioj
(1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action fo
the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiratioi
of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the firs
action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance OJ
from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limi
tations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this
act becomes effective.
History:

L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-725.

Collateral References.
Sales<3=>394, 409.
78 C.J.S. Sales §§ 505, 524.

(The next section number is 70A-3-101)

CHAPTER 3
COMMEECIAL P A P E R
Part 1. Short Title, Form and Interpretation
Section 70A-3-101.
70A-3-102.
70A-3-103.
70A-3-104.
70A-3-105.
70A-3-106.
70A-3-107.
70A-3-108.
70A-3-109.
70A-3-110.
70A-3-111.
70A-3-112.
70A-3-113.
70A-3-114.
70A-3-115.
70A-3-116.
70A-3-117.
70A-3-118.
70A-3-119.
70A-3-120.
70A-3-121.
70A-3-122.

Short title.
Definitions and index of definitions.
Limitations on scope of chapter.
Form of negotiable instruments—"Draft"—"Checkv—"Certificate
of deposit"—"Note."
When promise or order unconditional.
Sum certain.
Money.
Payable on demand.
Definite time.
Payable to order.
Payable to bearer.
Terms and omissions not affecting negotiability.
Seal.
Date, antedating, postdating.
Incomplete instruments.
Instruments payable to two or more persons.
Instruments payable with words of description.
Ambiguous terms and rules of construction.
Other writings affecting instrument.
Instruments "payable through" bank.
Instruments payable at bank.
Accrual of cause of action.
Part 2. Transfer and Negotiation

70A-2-725.

Statute of limitations in contracts for sale.—(1)

An action

70A-2-72
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RAYMOND M. BERRY
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE,
dba B & B PLAZA, INC.,
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL
WIOJH PREJUDICE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
LEGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,

CiMil No. 24,518

Defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the
above-entitled Court on Monday, June 2, 19 86, Honorable VeNoy
Christoffersen, District Judge presiding; the Court having
„ considered the Affidavits of the parties and the memoranda of
the parties and having found the plaintiffs did not institute
their action until after seven (7) years after the sale of the
concrete and delivery of the same to the site and otherwise
being fully advised in the premises,
NOW, THEREFORE, judgment is entered in favor of the
Defendant, that plaintiffs take nothing, and that the action be
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SETH S. ALLEN, Clerk

dismissed with/j5rejudice.
t*
is / (r -^ day olf June, 1986,
DATED
BY THE CO

VENOY CHRISTAFFERS E/, District Judge
/
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